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B eauty,	 like	 most	 philosophically	 gripping	 phenomena,	 has	its	fanatics.	Claims	for	it	(and	against	it)	often	seem	overblown	or	 grandiose,	 attributing	 to	 beauty	 a	 kind	 of	mystical	 or	 reli-
gious	 import,	 or	 saying,	with	Plato,	 that	 contemplation	of	beauty	 is	
what	 ultimately	 makes	 life	 worth	 living.1	 G.E.	 Moore	 claims	 at	 the	
end	of	Principia Ethica	that	“…personal	affections	and	aesthetic	enjoy-
ments	 include	all the	greatest,	and	by far	 the	greatest,	goods	we	can	
imagine…”	and	calls	this	“the	ultimate	and	fundamental	truth	of	Moral	
Philosophy.”2	Friedrich	Schiller	tells	us,	amazingly,	“It	is	only	through	









once	so	eager	 to	give	 it	—	as	 if	only	blanket	dismissal	could	provide	
enough	distance	 from	such	an	awkward	past.	Necessity,	 truth,	 ratio-










Beauty	that	man	makes	his	way	to	Freedom”,	On the Aesthetic Education of Man,	
second	letter,	§5.	See	also	the	twenty-third	letter.
4.	 Here	 are	 two	 other	 apparently	 similar	 remarks:	Wittgenstein	 in	 the	Tracta-
tus (6.421):	 “Ethics	 and	aesthetics	 are	one	and	 the	 same.”	Nietzsche	 in	 the	
The Birth of Tragedy:	“…only	as	an	aesthetic phenomenon	are	existence	and	the	
world	justified	to	eternity”.
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It	 is	one	 thing	 to	 think	 that	we	shouldn’t	 take	such	cases	as	our	
philosophical	 starting	 point,	 and	 quite	 another	 to	 think	 that	 we	
should	ignore	them	altogether.	One	might	reasonably	think	that	the	
theory	of	beauty	shouldn’t	begin	with	what	might	turn	out	to	be	ex-





















In	 some	cases,	 the	 thought	 that	beauty	 is,	 or	 could	be,	profound	 in	
some	way	is	explicitly	set	aside	as	parochial,	idiosyncratic,	or	just	too	
obscure.	Near	 the	beginning	of	 Jerrold	Levinson’s	 recent	account	of	
visual	beauty,	for	example,	he	writes,
Before	 proceeding,	 though,	 I	must	 briefly	 acknowledge	
another	 tradition	 of	 theorizing	 beauty,	 initiated	 by	 Pla-
to,	 that	makes	of	 it	a	richer	affair,	or	sets	 for	 it	a	higher	
standard.	This	is	a	tradition	according	to	which	beauty	is	









his	 thesis	 is	 that	 “beauty	 is	 not	 one”.	He	proceeds	 to	offer	 a	 careful	
taxonomy	of	 species	 of	 visual	 beauty,	 including,	 among	others,	 nat-
ural	 beauty,	 human	beauty,	 formal	 beauty,	 and	 abstract	 beauty	—	all	
of	 which	 characterize	 “some	 beautiful	 objects,	 of	 certain	 sorts,	 in	
some	conditions	of	reception”,	but	not	“all	such	objects	or	occasions	
of	beholding”.	 For	 all	 Levinson	has	 said,	 there	 is	 another	 species	of	
beauty	—	ennobling,	 or	 self-transcending,	 or	 inspiring	 beauty	—	that	
5.	 See	 Jerrold	 Levinson’s	 “Beauty	 is	 Not	 One:	 The	 Irreducible	 Variety	 of	 Vi-
sual	Beauty”,	 in	The Aesthetic Mind: Philosophy and Psychology,	eds.	Elisabeth	
Schellekens	and	Peter	Goldie,	Oxford	University	Press,	2012,	pp.	190–207.
6.	 Ibid.,	p.	192.
































ful	discussion,	 see	 Justin	D’Arms	and	Daniel	 Jacobson,	 “The	Moralistic	Fal-








ects.	 Put	 positively,	 for	 pleasure	 to	 be	 aesthetic	 it	must	
















primarily	 in	 the	normative	notion,	 in	 the	 idea	 that	a	pleasure	 is	aes-
thetic	only	if	 it	 is	warranted	or	merited	by	“sympathetic	attention	to”	
7.	 “Pleasure	and	the	Value	of	Works	of	Art”,	originally	in	British Journal of Aesthet-
ics,	Vol.	32,	No.	4,	pp.	295–306,	October	1992,	and	reprinted	in	Levinson’s	The 
Pleasures of Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays,	Cornell	University	Press,	pp.15–6.	
There	are	many	expressions	of	such	a	view	in	the	literature.	Sometimes	the	
view	 is	 restricted	 to	 pleasure	 in	 artworks;	 sometimes	 artworks	 are	 treated	










For	 certainly	our	 satisfaction	 in	 an	artwork,	 even	when	
wholly	 focused	on	 the	object	 and	 its	 structure,	 causally	
presupposes	something	about	our	dispositions	and	affec-
tions	 and	 thus,	 in	 a	 sense,	 answers	 to	 them.	Art	moves	
human	beings,	after	all,	in	part	because	of	how	humans	
are.	But	 the	point	not	 to	 lose	 sight	of	 is	 that	where	 the	
psychological	conditions	required	for	an	artwork	to	elicit	
a	positive	response	are	such	as	are	common to all persons…
then	the	satisfaction	that	such	conditions	underpin	may	
still	qualify	as	disinterested	and	thus	aesthetic….12 
Levinson	 posits	 a	 relation	 between	 aesthetic	 affect	 and	 shared	 “dis-
positions	and	affections”.	But	 it’s	not	entirely	clear	what	Levinson	 is	
saying	about	this	relation,	nor	is	it	clear	what	he	thinks	supports	this	









not entail	 the	 necessary	 condition	 Levinson	 states	 in	 the	 above	 pas-
sage.	For	all	Disinterest-	and	+	say,	people	may	have	differing	war-
ranted	 responses.	 Disinterest-	 and	 +	 are	 compatible	 with	 the	 pos-
sibility	 that	aesthetic	pleasure	 is	merited	by	different	objects	 for	dif-
























very	partial	and	not	a	pure	 judgment	of	 taste.”	On	one	reading,	 this	
extends	 the	disinterest	 criterion	 from	a	 condition	on	 interest	 in	 the	
object	to	any	interest	at	all.	And	Levinson’s	statement	of	Disinterest+ 
might	 suggest	 that	 he	 agrees	with	 this,	 particularly	when	he	writes	




































University	 Press,	 2007:	 “In	 the	 realm	of	 ‘the	 aesthetic’,	 I	 am	 including	 any	
reactions	we	form	toward	the	sensuous	and/or	design	qualities	of	any	object,	
phenomenon,	or	activity”	(p.	9).
15.	 J.L.	 Austin,	 “A	 Plea	 for	 Excuses”,	 in	 Philosophical Papers,	 Oxford	 University	
Press,	1961,	p.	131.
16.	 For	 recent	 discussion,	 see	 Dominic	 McIver	 Lopes’s	 “The	 Myth	 of	 (Non-
Aesthetic)	Artistic	Value”,	 in	The Philosophical Quarterly,	Vol.	61,	No.	244,	pp.	


























































ty	 that	 a	 theory	 needs	 to	 capture,	 that	 the	 affective	 notion	 that	 fea-
tures	in	the	theory,	whatever	it	is,	must	be	able	to	explain,	illuminate,	





















hedonists	here.)	Even	 if	enjoyment	of	a	sort	 should	figure	 in	a	very	
general	account	of	the	aesthetic,	what	is	it	about	beauty	in	particular	
that	might	lead	one	to	place	it	at	such	heights?
The	 temptation	 to	 do	 so	 is	 strong	—	so	 strong	 that	 its	 effects	 are	
present	even	within	 the	 tradition	of	 emphasizing	disinterested	plea-
sure.	Disinterest	is	not	promoted	only	by	those	who	want	to	focus	on	






Schopenhauer,	 for	 example,	 takes	 Disinterest-	 to	 new	 heights	
when	he	writes	that	“…aesthetic	pleasure	in	the	beautiful	consists,	to	
a	 large	extent,	 in	 the	 fact	 that,	when	we	enter	 the	state	of	pure	con-





beauty	 is	 entirely	unjustifiable.	The	past	 emphasis	on	beauty	 in	art	 theory,	
production,	and	criticism	had	a	pernicious	influence	and	was	worth	resisting.
18. The World as Will and Representation,	Vol.	I,	§68.

































































a	 shape,	 he	 realized	 that	 for	many	 years,	 unknown	 to	
himself,	he	had	had	an	image	locked	somewhere	within	
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to	 leap	upwards	with	 it;	her	 lips	at	 the	 same	 time	curv-
ing	in	a	friendly	smile	for	the	worn	old	stones	of	which	
the	setting	sun	now	illumined	no	more	than	the	topmost	






























of	self-or	life-shaping	values.20	Bathilde	Amédée, the grandmother of the 
narrator (for convenience I’ll call him “Marcel”),	loves	the	beauty	of	the	
church	steeple	in	Combray	for	its	“naturalness”	and	“distinction”	—	val-
ues	she	“prizes	above	anything	else	in	the	world”:
Without	 quite	 knowing	 why,	 my	 grandmother	 found	
in	 the	 steeple	 of	 Saint-Hilaire	 that	 absence	 of	 vulgarity,	

















hands	 joined	 in	prayer,	 she	would	absorb	herself	 so	ut-
terly	in	the	outpouring	of	the	spire	that	her	gaze	seemed	
20.	I	use	a	few	examples	from	Proust,	whose	novel	In Search of Lost Time	is	full	of	
fascinating	and	subtle	descriptions	of	the	encounter	with	beauty.	I	agree	with	
Richard	Moran’s	suggestion	that	“it	should	be	beyond	question	that	Marcel	
Proust	 is	at	 least	as	decisive	a	 thinker	about	 the	nature	of	beauty	as	 is	 Im-
manuel	Kant”.	See	his	“Kant,	Proust,	and	the	Appeal	of	Beauty”,	Critical Inquiry,	
Vol.	38,	No.	2,	pp.	303–04,	Winter	2012.	All	citations	of	In Search of Lost Time 
are	from	Volume	1:	Swann’s Way	of	C.K.	Scott	Moncrieff	and	Terence	Kilmar-
tin’s	translation	of	À la recherche du temps perdu,	Random	House,	1981.
21.	 “Je	suis	sure	que	s’il	jouait	du	piano,	il	ne	jouerait	pas	sec.”











































Before	hearing	 the	music,	 Swann	 is	 acting	on	his	usual	preferences	
and	values,	 but	his	 experience	of	 the	music	 alters	 these	values	 and	
gives	Swann	a	new	perspective	on	what	matters	to	him.	Swann	finds	
in	it	an	“invisible	reality”	whose	“recreative	influence”	gives	him	the	
















Mitchell’s	translation	in	The Selected Poetry of Rainer Maria Rilke,	Vintage,	1989.




































…recognized	 that	 kind	 of	 pleasure	 which	 requires,	 it	
is	 true,	 a	 certain	 effort	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	mind,	 but	 in	
comparison	with	which	the	attractions	of	the	indolence	
which	 inclines	us	 to	 renounce	 that	pleasure	 seem	very	





































capturing	 the	 phenomena.	 There	 are	 two	 general	 approaches	 a	 dis-
interest	theorist	might	take.	One	is	to	argue	that	self-awareness	—	es-
pecially	of	the	sort	that	might	result	in	a	transformative	sense	of	self-	

















The	 “ideal	 self”	 that	William	Stoner’s	experience	 involves	seems	per-
sonal	 and	 contentful —	it	 is	 not	 a	 general	 conception	of	 a	 kind	of	 be-
ing	 that	has	a	 certain	moral	 capacity.	 It	 is	an	 individual	or	personal,	
if	somewhat	vague,	conception	of	a	particular	kind	of	person	Stoner	
have	tried	to	articulate	it,	as	we	have	seen,	it	has	more	often	been	by	

















bust	 is	 an	 object	 of	metaphorical	 regard,	 and	Gould’s	 artwork	—	de-
scribed	as	a	“shard	of	glass”	—	is,	for	all	we	can	tell,	an	abstract	piece.	










of	much	recent	work.	See,	for	example,	Marya	Schechtman’s The Constitution 
of Selves, Cornell University Press, 1996, and her more recent Staying Alive: Personal 
Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life, Oxford	University	Press,	2014;	
see	also	Peter	Goldie’s	The Mess Inside: Narrative, Emotion, and the Mind,	Oxford	
University	Press,	2012.




























problem	a	disinterest	 theorist	 faces	 is	 that	 it	 plays	 into	 the	hand	of	
our	 two	 strategies	 against	 disinterest.	 Consider	 the	 second	 strategy,	
which	was	to	argue	that,	on	its	own,	the	requirement	of	a	common	or	
30.	In	my	paper	 “Ideals	as	Metaphors”	 (in	progress),	 I	develop	a	 theory	of	per-
sonal	 ideals	 according	 to	 which	 ideal	 self-conceptions	 are	 metaphorical	











finds	 in	himself	 (and	 in	 “his”	music)	a	desire	 to	 “consecrate”	his	 life.	



















































































































should	 be	 the	 central	 affective	 notion	 in	 the	 theory	 of	 beauty.	 The	







32.	 Thanks	 to	 the	 anonymous	 referee	 who	 encouraged	me	 to	 include	 a	 note	
about	Kant	and	aesthetic	ideas.
33.	 I	begin	to	take	up	this	project	in	my	forthcoming	paper	“Aesthetic	Love”,	in 
Art & Philosophy: New Essays at the Intersection,	ed.	Christy	Mag	Uidhir,	Oxford	
University	Press.	For	a	healthy	dose	of	the	tradition,	see	Plato’s	Symposium;	
Burke’s	 A Philosophical Enquiry;	 Mary	 Mothersill’s	 Beauty Restored, Adams,	
Banister,	and	Cox,	1984 (especially	chapter	9);	Alexander	Nehamas’s	Only a 
Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World of Art,	Princeton	University	
Press,	2007;	and	Richard	Moran’s	“Kant,	Proust,	and	the	Appeal	of	Beauty”.	I	



























though	 without	 it	 being	 possible	 for	 any	 determinate	 thought,	 i. e.,	
concept,	to	be	adequate	to	it”	(§49,	314).	Aesthetic	ideas	are	sensible	










It	 would	 seem,	 then,	 that	 the	 view	 of	 beauty	 I	 am	 suggesting	
here	—	roughly,	 beauty	 as	 the	 expression	 of	 personal	 ideals	—	has	 a	
